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Abstract
This paper introduces a form of boundedly-rational in￿ ation expectations in the New
Keynesian Phillips curve. The representative agent is assumed to behave as an econome-
trician, employing a time series model for in￿ ation that allows for both permanent and
temporary shocks. The near-unity coe¢ cient on expected in￿ ation in the Phillips curve
causes the agent￿ s perception of a unit root in in￿ ation to become close to self-ful￿lling.
In a ￿consistent expectations equilibrium,￿the value of the Kalman gain parameter in the
agent￿ s forecast rule is pinned down using the observed autocorrelation of in￿ ation changes.
The forecast errors observed by the agent are close to white noise, making it di¢ cult for
the agent to detect a misspeci￿cation of the forecast rule. I show that this simple model of
in￿ ation expectations can generate time-varying persistence and volatility that is broadly
similar to that observed in long-run U.S. data. Model-based values for expected in￿ ation
track well with movements in survey-based measures of U.S. expected in￿ ation. In nu-
merical simulations, the model can generate pronounced low-frequency swings in the level
of in￿ ation that are driven solely by expectational feedback, not by changes in monetary
policy.
Keywords: In￿ation Expectations, Phillips Curve, Time-Varying Persistence & Volatility.
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1.1 Overview
The New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) is derived most straightforwardly from Calvo￿ s
(1983) model of sticky price adjustment. Numerous researchers have criticized the fully-
rational NKPC on grounds that a reasonably parameterized version fails to capture important
features of post-World War II U.S. data, namely, high levels of in￿ ation persistence and the
delayed and gradual response of in￿ ation to unanticipated monetary policy shocks.1 Other
researchers have argued that the appropriate inclusion of exogenous stochastic driving variables
that re￿ ect changes in monetary policy can improve the empirical performance of the fully-
rational NKPC.2
This paper introduces a form of boundedly-rational in￿ ation expectations in the NKPC for
an economy where all monetary policy variables are held constant. The representative agent
is assumed to behave as an econometrician, employing a time series model for in￿ ation that
allows for both permanent and temporary shocks. The agent￿ s perceived optimal forecast rule
is de￿ned by the Kalman ￿lter. I show that the perceived optimal value of the Kalman gain
parameter assigned to the last observed in￿ ation rate is given by the ￿xed point of a nonlinear
map that relates the gain parameter to the observed autocorrelation of in￿ ation changes. By
computing the value of the autocorrelation coe¢ cient, the agent can identify the ￿signal-to-
noise ratio,￿which measures the relative variances of the perceived permanent and temporary
shocks to in￿ ation. A higher signal-to-noise ratio calls for a higher Kalman gain parameter
which, in turn, places more weight on recent in￿ ation data in the agent￿ s forecast rule. In a
￿consistent expectations equilibrium,￿the forecast errors observed by the agent are close to
white noise, making it di¢ cult for the agent to detect a misspeci￿cation of the forecast rule.3
Moreover, from the individual agent￿ s perspective, switching to a fundamentals-based in￿ ation
forecast (which makes use of the output gap or real marginal cost) would appear to reduce
forecast accuracy, so there is no incentive to switch. Intuitively, the equilibrium exploits the
fact that expected in￿ ation enters the NKPC with a near-unity coe¢ cient. This feature causes
the agent￿ s perception of a unit root in in￿ ation to become close to self-ful￿lling.
The model allows for either a constant gain or a variable gain, depending on the length
of the sample period used by the agent to identify the signal-to-noise ratio from observed
in￿ ation data. As the sample period becomes in￿nitely long, the equilibrium yields a constant
gain. A rolling sample period yields a variable gain. From the agent￿ s perspective, the use
of a variable Kalman gain is justi￿ed by perceived movements in the signal-to-noise ratio.
1See, for example, Roberts (1997, 2005), Fuhrer (1997, 2006), Mankiw (2001), Estrella and Fuhrer (2002),
and Rudd and Whelan (2005a, 2007).
2See, for example, Kozicki and Tinsley (2002, 2005), Ireland (2007), and Cogley and Sbordone (2008).
3This boundedly-rational equilibrium concept was developed by Hommes and Sorger (1998). A closely-
related concept is the ￿restricted perceptions equilibrium￿described by Evans and Honkopohja (2001, Chapter
13).
1In the variable-gain version of the model, the nonlinear law of motion for in￿ ation generates
time-varying persistence and volatility that is broadly similar to that observed in long-run
U.S. data.
The model￿ s methodology for identifying the signal-to-noise ratio can be applied directly
to U.S. in￿ ation data. The identi￿ed U.S. signal-to-noise ratio exhibits an upward drift during
the 1970s, followed by downward drift from the mid-1990s onwards. The downward drifting
ratio over the last decade indicates a reduced likelihood of a permanent shift, either upwards
or downwards, in the Fed￿ s in￿ ation target. This evidence is consistent with the idea of
￿well-anchored in￿ ation expectations￿in describing the recent environment (see, for example,
Williams 2006). The identi￿ed signal-to-noise ratio in U.S. data might therefore be viewed as
an inverse measure of the Fed￿ s credibility for maintaining a constant in￿ ation target. In the
consistent expectations framework, the agent￿ s in￿ ation forecast is an exponentially-weighted
moving average of past observed in￿ ation rates. This feature tracks well with movements in
survey-based measures of U.S. expected in￿ ation.
The driving variable for in￿ ation in the model can be interpreted as either the output gap or
real marginal cost. Monetary policy enters the model implicitly through two channels: (i) the
steady-state in￿ ation rate around which the NKPC is log-linearized￿ maintained here at zero,
or (ii) the parameters that govern the exogenous stochastic process for the driving variable.
All policy-dependent parameters are held constant throughout the analysis. Interestingly, the
model can generate pronounced low-frequency swings in the level of in￿ ation that are driven
solely by expectational feedback, not by changes in monetary policy. The low-frequency swings
derive from the near-random walk behavior of in￿ ation under consistent expectations. From
the agent￿ s perspective, the observed low-frequency swings justify the use of a forecast rule
that allows for permanent shocks. This aspect of the model bears similarity to the ￿optimal
misspeci￿ed beliefs￿concept described by Sargent (1999, Chapter 6).
Klein (1978) and Barsky (1987) were among the ￿rst to call attention to the dramatic
changes in in￿ ation persistence in long-run U.S. data. Barsky (p. 3) noted that ￿In￿ ation
evolved from essentially a white noise process in the pre-World War I years, to a highly
persistent, non-stationary ARIMA process in the post-1960 period.￿ More recently, Cogley
and Sargent (2002, 2005) employ vector autoregressions that allow for drifting coe¢ cients
and stochastic volatility to document the evolving nature of U.S. in￿ ation dynamics in post-
World War II data. Their methodology identi￿es a positive correlation between measures of
persistence, volatility, and the level of in￿ ation in post-World War II data. Simple 20-year
rolling summary statistics con￿rm these basic ￿ndings. As a caveat, it should be noted that
￿ndings of time-varying in￿ ation persistence in recent data are not universal. Pivetta and Reis
(2007) argue that the wide con￿dence intervals around measures of in￿ ation persistence do
not allow one to reject the hypothesis of no change in persistence since 1965. These authors
do ￿nd robust evidence of a change in in￿ ation volatility, however.
Shifts in monetary policy are one candidate for explaining changes in in￿ ation dynamics.
2Both Klein (1978) and Barsky (1987) attribute the change in in￿ ation persistence after World
War I to the abandonment of the classical gold standard. A gold standard can be viewed as a
price-level targeting regime. Under an in￿ ation-targeting regime, shifts in the central bank￿ s
in￿ ation target (which determines the trend in￿ ation rate) can distort standard measures
of persistence and volatility. For this reason, measures of persistence and volatility should
be conditioned on an estimate of trend in￿ ation.4 In computing the 20-year rolling summary
statistics, I control for shifts in trend in￿ ation by ￿rst extracting the low-frequency component
of U.S. in￿ ation. Detrended in￿ ation continues to exhibit time-varying patterns of persistence
and volatility, even during periods of seemingly-unchanged monetary policy, such as the sample
period since 1995. Such observations suggest that U.S. in￿ ation is driven by a number of
di⁄erent nonlinearities, not just those attributable to policy regime shifts.
1.2 Related Literature
The consideration of boundedly-rational in￿ ation expectations is motivated by empirical evi-
dence. Survey-based measures of U.S. in￿ ation expectations tend to systematically underpre-
dict actual in￿ ation in the sample period prior to October 1979 and systematically overpredict
it thereafter. Rational expectations would not give rise to a sustained sequence of one-sided
forecast errors. Roberts (1997), Carroll (2003), Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers (2004), and Branch
(2004) all ￿nd evidence that survey-based measures of U.S. in￿ ation expectations do not make
the most e¢ cient use of available information.
The boundedly-rational form of expectations used here is similar to that explored by Evans
and Ramey (2006) in the context of the Lucas (1973) monetary policy model. In their frame-
work, the value of the gain parameter is pinned down using a Nash equilibrium concept.5
An empirical study by Ball (2000) allows for a switch between two forms of ￿near-rational￿
forecast rules to help account for the dramatic change in U.S. in￿ ation persistence identi￿ed
by Klein (1978) and Barsky (1987). In Ball￿ s framework, the switch between forecast rules is
imposed within the model; it is not an endogenous response to an actual or perceived shift in
fundamentals.
Orphanides and Williams (2005) and Milani (2005) introduce in￿ ation persistence in the
form of constant-gain learning in models where the underlying fundamentals do not shift. The
representative agent￿ s perceived law of motion for in￿ ation is an AR(1) process with parameters
that are perpetually re-estimated using recent data. Unlike here, the constant gain used in the
learning algorithm is a free parameter that is calibrated rather than endogenized within the
model itself. In the learning model of Erceg and Levin (2003), the value of the gain parameter
is estimated by minimizing the squared deviations between the model￿ s in￿ ation expectations
4This point has been emphasized by Kozicki and Tinsley (2002), Levin and Piger (2004), and Marques
(2004), among others.
5The use of a Nash equilibrium to determine the gain was ￿rst demonstrated by Evans and Honkopohja
(1993).
3and survey-based U.S. in￿ ation expectations.
Research that examines the links between exogenous policy rule shifts and in￿ ation dynam-
ics includes Boivin and Giannoni (2006), Roberts (2006), and Cecchetti et al. (2007). Papers
by Kozicki and Tinsley (2002, 2005), Ireland (2007), and Cogley and Sbordone (2008) show
that the empirical performance of the fully-rational NKPC can be improved by introducing
a highly persistent, exogenous stochastic process for the central bank￿ s in￿ ation target. It
remains unclear, however, why an optimizing central bank would wish to adopt such a process
for the in￿ ation target.6 Moreover, in order to account for the time-varying dynamic prop-
erties of detrended U.S. in￿ ation, these models would need to incorporate exogenous shifts
in other parameters of the central bank￿ s policy rule. The approach taken here is to develop
a model that abstracts from actual shifts in the central bank￿ s in￿ ation target or any other
aspect of monetary policy. The model simulations are compared to U.S. data on the basis
of detrended in￿ ation behavior￿ analogous to the methodology employed in the real business
cycle literature. The main message of the paper is that expectational feedback can be an
important driving force for in￿ ation dynamics.
2 Time-Varying Persistence and Volatility in U.S. In￿ ation
Figure 1 provides evidence of time-varying persistence and volatility in U.S. in￿ ation data.
The left-side panels plot the data and 20-year rolling summary statistics for CPI in￿ ation
from 1871.Q1 to 2004.Q4. The right-side panels plot the same information for GDP price
in￿ ation from 1949.Q1 to 2004.Q4.7 The 20-year rolling summary statistics are computed for
both the raw and detrended in￿ ation series. Detrending is a way to control for shifts in the
central bank￿ s in￿ ation target that may have occurred over time.8
[Figure 1 about here]
Panel 1a illustrates the dramatic di⁄erence in the behavior of pre- and post-World War I
in￿ ation noted by Klein (1978) and Barsky (1987). The simple measure of persistence used
6In Ireland (2007), the law of motion for the in￿ ation target is a geometric random walk. Exogenous shocks
can permanently shift the target by amounts that are determined by exogenous monetary policy coe¢ cients.
7The annualized 1-quarter in￿ ation rate is given by 4log(Pt=Pt￿1); where Pt is the relevant price in-
dex. The quarterly CPI data were constructed by averaging monthly CPI data obtained from Robert
Shiller￿ s website: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data/ie_data.htm. Shiller￿ s data employs the CPI-U
(Consumer Price Index-All Urban Consumers) published by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics from 1913
onward. For prior years, Shiller￿ s price index is constructed by splicing to monthly price data obtained
from Warren and Pearson (1935, Table 1, pp. 11￿ 14). Data on the quarterly GDP price index is from
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GDPCTPI.
8Throughout the paper, the in￿ ation trend is de￿ned as the low-frequency component of the data (￿ uctua-
tions longer than 32 quarters) extracted using the band pass ￿lter approximation of Christiano and Fitzgerald
(2003). Similar results are obtained if the data are detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott ￿lter with a smoothing
parameter of 1600.
4here is the 20-year rolling autocorrelation coe¢ cient.9 Persistence hovers close to zero during
the pre-World War I era but then starts to increase around the year 1915 (panel 1c). There are
some notable variations in persistence over the ensuing decades, followed by a sharp drop in the
rolling autocorrelation towards the end of the sample. The end-of-sample drop in persistence
is also evident in GDP price in￿ ation (panel 1d).
Volatility is measured by the 20-year rolling standard deviation. The volatility of CPI
in￿ ation declines from the early part of the sample until about the year 1970. Volatility then
traces out a hump-shaped pattern over the next 35 years (panel 1e). The volatility of GDP
price in￿ ation exhibits a similar hump-shaped pattern (panel 1f).
Measures of persistence and volatility are generally lower in the detrended data, but the
basic patterns resemble those in the raw data. Notice that these measures have declined
during the sample period since 1995. During the post-World War II sample period, the most
striking feature is the similarity in the patterns observed for the rolling persistence, rolling
volatility, and rolling mean of U.S. in￿ ation. This result con￿rms the ￿ndings of Cogley
and Sargent (2002, 2005) who use forward-looking Bayesian methods to identify a strong
positive correlation among summary statistics computed for post-World War II in￿ ation data.
Interestingly, one can identify some roughly similar patterns of comovement in the rolling
summary statistics for the earlier in￿ ation data plotted on the left-side of Figure 1. Overall,
the time-varying features of the data suggest the presence of nonlinearities in the law of motion
for U.S. in￿ ation. In later sections of the paper, a quantitative summary of U.S. in￿ ation
dynamics will be compared with the results of model simulations.
3 The New Keynesian Phillips Curve
The starting point for the analysis is the standard NKPC:






where ￿t is the in￿ ation rate de￿ned as the log di⁄erence of the price level, ￿ is the represen-
tative agent￿ s subjective time discount factor, yt is a stationary driving variable, and "t is an
iid markup shock that is often motivated by the presence of a variable tax rate.10 The symbol
b Et represents the agent￿ s subjective expectation conditioned on information available at time
t. Under rational expectations, b Et corresponds to the mathematical expectation operator Et
evaluated using the objective distributions of the driving variable and the markup shock.
The driving variable can be interpreted as either the output gap (often measured by de-
trended real GDP) or the representative ￿rm￿ s real marginal cost (often measured by labor￿ s
9Another commonly-used measure of persistence is the sum of the autoregressive coe¢ cients in a univariate
regression. In the case of an AR(2) with coe¢ cients ￿1 and ￿2; we have Corr(￿t;￿t￿1) = ￿1=(1 ￿ ￿2): Both
measures of persistence are increasing in ￿1 and ￿2:
10The rational expectations version of equation (1) is derived by Woodford (2003, Chapter 3).
5share of income). Since yt is taken here to be exogenous, none of the paper￿ s theoretical results
depend on which interpretation is chosen.11 The law of motion for the driving variable is






where ut is an iid demand shock that is uncorrelated with the markup shock.
Monetary policy enters implicitly in the model through two potential channels. The ￿rst
is the steady-state in￿ ation rate that is used when deriving equation (1) using a log-linear
approximation. The second is the values of ￿ and ￿2
u; which can be interpreted as reduced-
form parameters that depend in a complicated way on the central bank￿ s policy rule.12 For
both of the equilibrium concepts described below, the in￿ ation process remains stationary
around the zero-in￿ ation steady state. The parameters ￿ and ￿2
u are held constant throughout
the analysis.
3.1 Rational Expectations
Under rational expectations, the in￿ ation rate at time t is uniquely pinned down by the
agent￿ s forecast of discounted future values of the driving variable, plus the current realization
of the markup shock. To derive the unique rational expectations solution, ￿rst replace b Et in
equation (1) with Et: Equation (1) can then be iterated forward to substitute out ￿t+1+k for
k = 0;1;2;::: Applying the law of iterated expectations and imposing a transversality condition








t represents the equilibrium in￿ ation rate under rational expectations. Given that ut







yt + "t; (4)
which shows that the rational (or fundamentals-based) in￿ ation rate inherits its stochastic
properties from both the autoregressive driving variable and the white-noise markup shock.
11In empirical applications, the choice of driving variable is quite important. Detrended real GDP is pro-
cyclical whereas labor￿ s share of income is countercyclical. See Rudd and Whelan (2005b).
12A simple example illustrates the point. Suppose that the IS equation is given by yt =
￿
h




ii ￿ b Et￿t+1 ￿ r
￿
+ &t; and the central bank￿ s policy rule is given by it =
r + g￿ b Et￿t+1 + gy b Etyt+1; where it is the policy instrument, r is the steady-state real rate, and &t is an iid de-
mand shock. Then, under rational expectations
￿
b Et = Et
￿
, it can be shown that the equilibrium IS equation is
exactly the form of (2), where ￿ and ￿
2
u both depend on g￿ and gy: If expectations are only boundedly-rational,
then (2) is still likely to be reasonable approximation of an empirically-plausible equilibrium IS equation.
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where V ar(￿) denotes the unconditional variance, Corr(￿;￿) is the unconditional correlation




Equation (6) con￿rms the results of Fuhrer (2006) that small values for the Phillips curve
slope parameter ￿ combined with nontrivial values for the shock variance ratio ￿2
"=￿2
u (the
empirically plausible case) imply weak persistence of in￿ ation under rational expectations￿ a
result that con￿ icts sharply with post-World War II U.S. in￿ ation data. Equation (7) predicts
that the autocorrelation of in￿ ation changes is negative￿ a robust feature of U.S. data. Small







￿0:5: In the post-World War II sample period, the autocorrelation of changes in U.S. GDP
price in￿ ation is ￿0:34:








which shows that the fundamentals-based in￿ ation forecast is perfectly correlated with move-
ments in the driving variable. The forecast requires information about the current value of
yt; the policy-dependent parameter ￿; and the Phillips curve slope parameter ￿: The discount
factor ￿ is aspect of the agent￿ s preferences and does not need to be observed.
3.2 Consistent Expectations
Equation (8) shows that rational forecasts derived from the standard NKPC are built on
strong assumptions about the representative agent￿ s information set. In actual forecasting
applications, real-time di¢ culties in observing the driving variable, together with empirical
instabilities in the parameters ￿ and ￿; could lead to large and persistent forecast errors.
Numerous studies have demonstrated that forecasts of U.S. in￿ ation computed from empirical
Phillips curve models can frequently underperform forecasts derived from simple univariate
time series models, such as a random walk, AR, or ARMA.13 One would expect to encounter
similar forecasting di¢ culties using the standard NKPC. These ideas motivate consideration of
13See, for example, Atkeson and Ohanian (2001), Orphanides and Van Norden (2005), Stock and Watson
(2007), and Ang. et al. (2007).
7a univariate forecasting algorithm￿ one that requires very little computational or informational
resources. A long history in macroeconomics suggests the following error-correction approach:
b Et￿t+1 = b Et￿1￿t + ￿
￿
￿t ￿ b Et￿1￿t
￿
; 0 < ￿ ￿ 1;
= ￿
h
￿t + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)
2 ￿t￿2 + :::
i
; (9)
where ￿t￿ b Et￿1￿t is the forecast error in period t: I assume that the agent￿ s subjective forecast
makes use of the contemporaneous realization ￿t: This setup avoids the introduction of an extra
lag of in￿ ation that might be viewed as arti￿cially in￿ uencing the resulting dynamics.14
Equation (9) implies that the agent￿ s forecast at time t is an exponentially-weighted moving
average of past observed in￿ ation rates. By comparison, the ￿sticky-information￿model of
Mankiw and Reis (2002) implies that the agent￿ s forecast at time t is based on an exponentially-
weighted moving average of past rational forecasts.15 Both arrangements bear symmetry to the
Calvo (1983) sticky-price model where the equilibrium price level at time t is an exponentially-
weighted moving average of past observed prices.
As originally shown by Muth (1960), the subjective forecast rule (9) will coincide with
rational expectations when the forecast variable follows a simple and intuitive law of motion.


































Cov (vt;￿t) = 0;
(10)
where ￿t is the unobservable in￿ ation trend, vt is a transitory shock that pushes ￿t away
from trend, and ￿t is permanent shock (uncorrelated with vt) that shifts the trend over time.
The subjective forecast b Et￿t+1 is set equal to the Kalman ￿lter estimate of ￿t: The random
walk plus noise speci￿cation in (10) is equivalent to an ARMA (1,1), as shown by Harvey
(1993, p. 125). From a behavioral perspective, the representative agent can be viewed as
an econometrician, employing a time series model identical to that used recently by Stock
and Watson (2007). It need not be the case that the agent literally believes that in￿ ation is
governed by a unit root process. Rather, the agent may simply consider (10) to be versatile and
parsimonious time series model for the purpose of constructing a real-time in￿ ation forecast,
say, because real-time data for the driving variable yt is subject to measurement error.
Some technical points are worth noting. First, although the perceived law of motion (10)
allows for permanent shifts in the in￿ ation trend, the equilibrium in￿ ation process (to be
de￿ned below) remains stationary around the zero-in￿ ation steady state. For this reason, I
14A lagged information assumption is often used in learning models to avoid simultaneity in the determination
of the actual and expected values of the forecast variable. In the continuous time limit, the distinction between
contemporaneous and lagged information disappears.
15The sticky-information model is discussed further in Section 7.
8abstract from changes in the functional form of the NKPC that arise when the Calvo pricing
equation is log-linearized around a non-zero in￿ ation rate, as shown by Ascari (2004) and
Sahuc (2006). Second, I abstract from ￿long-horizon expectations￿that arise in the NKPC
when forward-looking agents employ subjective forecasts of future in￿ ation, as discussed by
Preston (2005). The perceived law of motion (10) implies b Et￿t+j = b Et￿t+1 for all future
horizons j = 2; 3; 4::: Equation (1) can therefore be viewed as a log-linear approximation of a
more-complicated NKPC that explicitly incorporates long-horizon in￿ ation expectations.
The agent￿ s perceived optimal choice of ￿ in equation (9) is determined by the Kalman
￿lter, where the objective is to minimize the mean squared forecast error E
￿
￿t+1 ￿ b Et￿t+1
￿2
.







where ￿ = ￿2
￿ =￿2
v is the perceived signal-to-noise ratio.16 As ￿ ! 1; the gain parameter
approaches 1. From the agent￿ s perspective, the shocks themselves vt and ￿t are unobservable,
but the shock variances ￿2
￿ and ￿2
v can be inferred from the moments of in￿ ation changes ￿￿t;
which are observable.
Proposition 1. If the representative agent￿ s perceived law of motion is given by equation (10),
then the perceived optimal value of the Kalman gain parameter ￿ is uniquely pinned down by
the autocorrelation of observed in￿ation changes, Corr(￿￿t;￿￿t￿1):
Proof : From (10), we have ￿￿t = ￿t+vt￿vt￿1: Since ￿t and vt are perceived to be independent,
we have Cov (￿￿t;￿￿t￿1) = ￿￿2
v and V ar(￿￿t) = ￿2
￿+2￿2
v: Combining these two expressions





where ￿ = ￿2
￿ =￿2
v and Corr(￿￿t;￿￿t￿1) = Cov (￿￿t;￿￿t￿1)=V ar(￿￿t): The above expres-
sion shows that Corr(￿￿t;￿￿t￿1) uniquely pins down ￿ which, in turn, uniquely pins down
￿ from equation (11). ￿
Substituting the subjective forecast rule (9) into the NKPC equation (1) yields the following























































16For details of the derivation of (11), see Nerlove (1967, pp. 141-143). His results are expressed as a formula
for 1 ￿ ￿:
9where ￿ appears in numerous coe¢ cients. The variance-covariance matrix V of the left-side
variables in equation (12) can be computed using the formula:






where ￿ is the variance-covariance matrix of the fundamental shocks ut and "t. Since the
matrix A contains only ￿ve non-zero elements, straightforward (but tedious) computations
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2 (1 ￿ ￿2)
￿
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[1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)](1 ￿ ￿2)
; (17)
which are all nonlinear in the gain parameter ￿. From equation (16), we see that in￿ ation
persistence is always positive, but the precise magnitude depends on the value of ￿ and several
other parameters in a rather complicated way. Equation (17) shows that the agent￿ s in￿ ation
forecast is positively correlated with the driving variable yt, similar to the case of rational
expectations.
3.2.1 De￿ning the Consistent Expectations Equilibrium
This section de￿nes the concept of a ￿consistent expectations equilibrium￿ along the lines
of Hommes and Sorger (1998). By applying the results of Proposition 1, the value of the
10Kalman gain parameter ￿ can be pinned down using the unconditional moments of ￿￿t: By
construction of the equilibrium, the agent￿ s forecast rule will be parameterized such that the
perceived law of motion (PLM) and the actual law of motion (ALM) exhibit the same ￿rst-
order autocorrelation for ￿￿t:17 The following expression for ￿￿t can be derived from the



























































where the constants ai and bi are used here to represent combinations of parameters. Equation























































































is given by equation (17).
Dividing equation (20) by equation (19) yields an expression for Corr(￿￿t;￿￿t￿1) which
is nonlinear in the gain parameter ￿: This nonlinear expression is employed in the following
de￿nition of equilibrium.
De￿nition 1. A consistent expectations equilibrium is de￿ned as a perceived law of motion
(10), an actual law of motion (12), and an associated Kalman gain parameter ￿; such that ￿
17In Hommes and Sorger (1998), the PLM is linear, whereas the ALM is nonlinear. Here, the PLM is
nonstationary, whereas the ALM is stationary but highly persistent. In both cases, the PLM and the ALM
exhibit an identical autocorrelation statistic.















with V ar(￿￿t) and Cov (￿￿t;￿￿t￿1) computed from the actual law of motion, as given by
equations (19) and (20).
The equilibrium de￿ned above is closely related to the concept of ￿optimal misspeci￿ed
beliefs￿described by Sargent (1999, Chapter 6). In Sargent￿ s example, the gain parameter
in the agent￿ s adaptive forecast rule is chosen to minimize the one-step-ahead mean squared
forecast error, given data generated by the actual law of motion. Here, the agent behaves
similarly by choosing a Kalman gain that minimizes the mean squared forecast error for the
perceived law of motion, given a signal-to-noise ratio that is inferred from data generated
by the actual law of motion. In Sargent￿ s example, the unit root in the agent￿ s forecast
rule compensates for an omitted constant. Here, the unit root in the agent￿ s forecast rule
compensates for the omitted driving variable yt. In both cases, the agent￿ s misspeci￿ed forecast
rule alters the dynamics of the model in a way that tends to con￿rm the agent￿ s belief in a
unit root.
A more-complicated version of the model would allow the agent￿ s subject forecast b Etyt+1
to appear on the right side of equation (2), as in a micro-founded IS equation. If the agent￿ s
perceived law of motion for yt presumed the existence of a unit root, analogous to the form
of (10), then the actual law of motion for yt would likely be very persistent but stationary, as
assumed here. The Kalman gain parameters for the two subjective forecast rules b Etyt+1 and
b Et￿t+1 would then need to be determined simultaneously in equilibrium, possibly giving rise
to multiple consistent expectations equilibria.
4 Numerical Solution for the Equilibrium
The complexity of the nonlinear map ￿ = T (￿) necessitates a numerical solution for the
equilibrium. To accomplish this, the model is calibrated using a set of parameter values that
are either estimated directly or based on empirical estimates reported in the literature. I
choose ￿ = 0:90 and ￿u = 0:01 based on regressions using either the output gap (the deviation
of log real GDP from log potential output) or labor￿ s share of income (as a measure real
marginal cost) over the period 1949.Q1 to 2004.Q4.18 Estimates of the NKPC parameters
18Data on real GDP are from http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GDPC96. The potential output
series used in this paper is the one constructed by the U.S. Congressional Budget O¢ ce. The series is
available from http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GDPPOT.mm. Labor￿ s share of income is from
http://www.bls.gov/data, using series ID PRS85006173.
12￿; ￿; and ￿" are sensitive to the choice of the driving variable, the speci￿cation for in￿ ation
expectations, the sample period, and the econometric method.19 Based on the various studies,
I choose ￿ = 0:98; ￿ = 0:03; and ￿" = 0:01 as baseline values. I also examine the sensitivity
of the results to alternative parameter values.
Figure 2 plots T (￿) over the range 0 < ￿ ￿ 1 for two di⁄erent values of ￿: Other parameter
con￿gurations produced similarly-shaped T (￿) maps. At the baseline calibration with ￿ =
0:03, the unique ￿xed point occurs at ￿￿ = 0:346; which corresponds to Corr(￿￿t;￿￿t￿1) =
￿0:458: When ￿ = 0:08; the unique ￿xed point occurs at ￿￿ = 0:695; which corresponds to
Corr(￿￿t;￿￿t￿1) = ￿0:279: Plausible values for the quarterly discount factor ￿ imply a
near-unity coe¢ cient on b Et￿t+1 in the NKPC equation (1). This feature of the model causes
the agent￿ s perception of a unit root in in￿ ation to become close to self-ful￿lling for most
values of ￿. As a result, the plot of T (￿) lies very close to the 45-degree line for most values of
￿. Similar results would likely obtain for any in￿ ation equation that places a sizeable weight
on expected in￿ ation. The plot of T (￿) suggests that in￿ ation forecast accuracy is not likely
to su⁄er much as long as ￿ remains in the general vicinity of ￿￿: This conjecture turns out to
be true, as discussed later in section 6.
[Figure 2 about here]
Table 1 shows the theoretical moments of ￿￿t predicted by the perceived law of motion
(10) and the actual law of motion (12). By construction of the equilibrium, the standard
deviation and the ￿rst-order autocorrelation are identical for the two laws of motion. The
higher-order autocorrelations agree to the third decimal place, giving no obvious indication to
the agent that the perceived law of motion is misspeci￿ed.
Table 1: Theoretical Moments of ￿￿t
Statistic Perceived Law of Motion Actual Law of Motion




Note: Parameter values are ￿ = 0:03; ￿ = 0:98; ￿ = 0:90; ￿" = ￿u = 0:01:
Table 2 shows how equilibrium outcomes change with parameter values. Experiments with
the model show that the value of ￿￿ increases with the values of ￿; ￿; ￿; and ￿2
u; but decreases
with the value of ￿2
": Roughly speaking, parameter changes that increase the persistence of
actual in￿ ation have the e⁄ect of increasing the perceived signal-to-noise ratio and hence ￿￿:
Parameter changes that decrease the persistence of actual in￿ ation have the e⁄ect of decreas-
ing the perceived signal-to-noise ratio. The intuition for the e⁄ects of parameter changes is
19See, for example, Roberts (2005), Rudd and Whelan (2005a, 2007), Gal￿ et al. (2005), and Fuhrer (2006).
13straightforward. From the agent￿ s perspective, in￿ ation is comprised of a persistent signal
component ￿t and a transitory noise component vt: If a parameter shift causes observed in￿ a-
tion to become more persistent, then the agent￿ s inferred value of the signal-to-noise ratio ￿
will increase.
Table 2 also reports the numerically-computed slope of the nonlinear map at the equilib-
rium point, i.e., T 0 (￿￿). The slope is only slightly below unity for most parameterizations of
the model, again re￿ ecting the fact that the map runs very close to the 45-degree line in the
vicinity of ￿￿:







= 0:23: Under rational expectations, the autocorrelation coe¢ cient shrinks
rapidly as: (1) the fundamental shock ratio ￿2
"=￿2
u increases, (2) the discount factor ￿ de-
creases, or (3) the driving variable persistence ￿ decreases. Under consistent expectations, the
autocorrelation coe¢ cient is much less sensitive to changes in these parameter values.
Table 2: Sensitivity Analysis
Slope Parameter Persistence Parameters
Variance
Ratio Result



































































Notes: Baseline values are ￿ = 0:03; ￿ = 0:98 ￿ = 0:90; and ￿" = ￿u = 0:01:
Changes in ￿2
"=￿2
u are accomplished by adjusting ￿2
" while maintaining ￿2
u = (0:01)
2 :
Figure 3 shows how in￿ ation dynamics are in￿ uenced by the Kalman gain. All parameters
are set to their baseline values, but other parameter con￿gurations produced similarly-shaped
plots. For the parameter con￿gurations examined in Table 2, we have 0:19 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 0:70: Panel
3a shows that in￿ ation persistence is generally high, but drops o⁄ dramatically for ￿ > 0:9 or
￿ < 0:1. Panel 3b shows that in￿ ation volatility increases with ￿ in a nonlinear fashion and
always exceeds the corresponding value under rational expectations. The fact that in￿ ation
persistence and volatility can vary, depending on the value of ￿; is an important feature that
will be examined later in a ￿variable-gain￿version of the model.
[Figure 3 about here].
144.1 Real-Time Learning
This section investigates the convergence properties of the consistent expectations equilibrium
under real-time learning. Recall that the ￿xed point of the nonlinear map ￿ = T (￿) is
computed using the population autocorrelation Corr(￿￿t;￿￿t￿1): This statistic presumes
a ￿xed Kalman gain. However, in a real-time learning environment where the Kalman gain
evolves over time, the agent will only have knowledge of the sample autocorrelation which, in
turn, is in￿ uenced by the trajectory of the Kalman gain. The learning algorithm is described
by a system of nonlinear stochastic di⁄erence equations summarized in Appendix A.
For each 200,000 period simulation, I set ￿t = ￿￿ = 0:346 for the ￿rst 500 periods. Figure
4 plots the ￿rst 10,000 periods of each simulation, after which the results are not largely
changed. The end-of-simulation values of the Kalman gain are clustered in the range where
the theoretical map T (￿) lies very close to the 45-degree line. Due to the shape of the map,
a small amount of sampling variation in the autocorrelation coe¢ cient can translate into
sizable shifts in the Kalman gain, thereby a⁄ecting the speed of convergence and the end-of-
simulation value. For the eight learning simulations shown, the full-sample (200,000 period)
autocorrelations are: ￿0:484; ￿0:474; ￿0:467; ￿0:447; ￿0:441; ￿0:438; ￿0:414; and ￿0:405:
The corresponding end-of-simulation gains are: 0.224, 0.279, 0.311, 0.383, 0.400, 0.409, 0.470,
and 0.490. Over the eight simulations, the average full-sample autocorrelation is ￿0:446 which
is close to the theoretical model prediction of Corr(￿￿t;￿￿t￿1) = ￿0:458:
The sensitivity of the Kalman gain to the estimated autocorrelation coe¢ cient is a feature
of the nonlinear learning dynamics. This feature is incorporated into a ￿variable-gain￿version
of the model, to be discussed in Section 8.
[Figure 4 about here].
5 Applying the Model￿ s Methodology to U.S. In￿ ation Data
Figure 5 provides a check on the reasonableness of the equilibrium values of ￿￿ and ￿￿ implied
by the model. Panel 4a plots the 20-year rolling autocorrelation coe¢ cient for the change in
U.S. GDP price in￿ ation. The autocorrelation coe¢ cient is negative throughout the sample.
Panel 4b plots the perceived signal-to-noise ratio computed directly from the autocorrelation
coe¢ cient using the formula in Proposition 1. The perceived signal-to-noise ratio ￿ uctuates
from a low of 0.1 to a high of 5.7. The upward spike that occurs in the early-1990s is due to
the autocorrelation coe¢ cient becoming less negative at that time. The perceived ratio drifts
upward in the 1970s, remains high for about two decades, and then drifts downward from
the mid-1990s onwards. Stock and Watson (2007) obtain similar results when estimating an
unobserved-components model identical to (10) using data on U.S. GDP price in￿ ation from
1953.Q1 to 2004.Q4. Assuming that the shock variances follow independent geometric random
15walks, Stock and Watson (2007) identify a statistically signi￿cant hump-shaped pattern for the
variance of the permanent shock, but cannot reject the hypothesis of no change in the variance
of the transitory shock. Piger and Rasche (2006) report a decline in the estimated variance of
permanent shocks to U.S. in￿ ation in the sample period after 1994.Q1. They interpret their
results as ￿evidence that long-horizon in￿ ation expectations have become better anchored￿
during this period. The foregoing results suggest that the signal-to-noise ratio identi￿ed from
the data might be viewed as an inverse measure of the Fed￿ s credibility for maintaining a
constant in￿ ation target.
[Figure 5 about here]
Roberts (2006) presents evidence that the slope parameter in reduced-form Phillips curve
regressions has become smaller in recent decades. The consistent expectations model predicts
that a decline in the Phillips curve slope parameter ￿ will make actual in￿ ation less persistent
and therefore be accompanied by a decline in the perceived signal-to-noise ratio. The post-
1990 downward drift in the identi￿ed U.S. signal-to-noise ratio shown in panel 4b could thus
be partially attributable to a decline in the Phillips curve slope parameter.
Panel 4c plots the Kalman gain computed directly from the perceived signal-to-noise ratio
using equation (11). The rolling sample period allows the Kalman gain to adjust to perceived
shifts in the signal-to-noise ratio. The Kalman gain ￿ uctuates from a low of 0.28 to a high
of 0.87, with the high also occurring in the early 1990s. Section 8 presents a ￿variable-gain￿
version of the model where ￿ is pinned down using a rolling autocorrelation for ￿￿t.
Figure 6 compares U.S. expected in￿ ation to the corresponding model-based values. Ex-
pected in￿ ation in U.S. data is measured by the 1-year ahead forecast for GDP price in￿ ation
from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. Comparisons with other surveys yielded similar
results. The sample period for the survey starts in 1970.Q1.20 For the rational expectations
(RE) version of the model, expected in￿ ation is computed from equation (8) using the baseline
parameter values. The driving variable is either the output gap or labor￿ s share of income
from U.S. data.21 For the consistent expectations (CE) version of the model, expected in￿ a-
tion is computed from equation (9) with ￿ = 0:346; where ￿t is given by the realized value
of U.S. GDP price in￿ ation at time t: In other words, expected in￿ ation for the CE model
is an exponentially-weighted moving average of past realized U.S. GDP price in￿ ation. The
￿gure also plots expected in￿ ation for a variable-gain version of the CE model, where the
gain sequence is taken from the bottom panel of Figure 5.22 The ￿gure shows that the RE
20The survey is available from http://www.phil.frb.org/￿les/spf/cpie1.txt. It should be noted that model-
based values of expected in￿ ation are annualized 1-quarter rates, whereas the survey data are 1-year ahead
average in￿ ation rates.
21Recall that equation (8) implies a steady-state in￿ ation rate of zero. For comparison with the survey, the
RE model-based values are shifted up by a constant to match the mean of U.S. in￿ ation over the sample period.
22Both CE models employ the initial condition b Et￿1￿t = ￿t￿1; where ￿t￿1 is U.S. GDP price in￿ ation at
1968.Q4.
16model performs poorly in capturing observed movements in the survey-based measure of U.S.
expected in￿ ation, whereas both versions of the CE model perform well. The performance of
the RE model could of course be improved by introducing a persistent exogenous process for
the Fed￿ s actual in￿ ation target which would help capture the low frequency movements in
the survey data.
[Figure 6 about here]
6 In￿ ation Forecast Errors
This section characterizes the unconditional moments of in￿ ation forecast errors. When the
actual law of motion for in￿ ation is given by (12), the errors associated with the subjective
forecast rule (9) exhibit near-zero autocorrelation for most values of ￿: Furthermore, an agent
who is concerned about minimizing forecast errors can become ￿locked-in￿to the use of the
subjective forecast. In particular, for most values of ￿; the agent will perceive no accuracy
gain from switching to a fundamentals-based in￿ ation forecast.23
Suppose that the representative agent initially adopts the subjective forecast rule (9). The
initial choice could be justi￿ed for reasons of computational or informational simplicity. The
forecast error observed by the agent is given by














where I have made use of the actual law of motion (12).
Now consider an agent who is contemplating a switch to a fundamentals-based in￿ ation
forecast. In deciding whether to switch forecasts, the agent keeps track of the forecast errors
associated with each forecast method. Before any switch occurs, the actual law of motion for
￿t is still governed by (12). For simplicity, assume that enough time has gone by to allow the
agent to have discovered the stochastic process for the fundamental driving variable yt. Also
assume that the agent has knowledge of the Phillips curve slope parameter ￿ and the real-time
value of the driving variable. With these assumptions, a fundamentals-based in￿ ation forecast
can be represented by the right-side of equation (8). The associated forecast error is given by
err f
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yt;(22)
where the superscript ￿f￿denotes the error associated with the fundamentals-based forecast.
23Lansing (2006) examines the concept of forecast lock-in using a standard Lucas-type asset pricing model.
176.1 Forecast Lock-in
Given a su¢ ciently long time series of observations, the agent could compute the moments of
the observed forecast errors under each of the above scenarios. Appendix B provides analytical
expressions for the moments of the forecast errors. If the representative agent initially adopts






. Conditional on the same actual law of motion (12), the ￿tness measure for the





: Forecast lock-in occurs if
MSE < MSE f:
Figure 7 plots the moments of the in￿ ation forecast errors for 0 < ￿ ￿ 1: All parameters
are set to the baseline values. For ease of comparison across panels, I plot the root mean
squared error RMSE. Lower values imply a more accurate forecast. Vertical lines mark the
value ￿￿ that is consistent with the perceived law of motion (10).
[Figure 7 about here]
Panel 7a shows that the subjective forecast rule will become locked-in for 0 < ￿ < 0:98: In
this range, the combination of in￿ ation persistence and volatility induced by the actual law
of motion (12) cause the subjective forecast rule to be more accurate than the fundamentals-
based forecast. As ￿ ! 1, persistence declines and volatility rises (Figure 3), which has the
e⁄ect of reducing the accuracy of the subjective forecast relative to the fundamentals-based
forecast. Notice that the plot of RMSE for the subjective forecast is relatively ￿ at in the
vicinity of ￿￿: This validates the conjecture put forth earlier in the discussion of Figure 2;
forecast accuracy does not change much as long as ￿ remains in the general vicinity of ￿￿.
The intuition for why lock-in occurs is straightforward. In computing the forecast ￿tness
measures, the representative agent views the evolution of ￿t as being determined outside of his
control. In equilibrium, of course, the chosen forecast rule does in￿ uence the evolution of ￿t:
When the agent initially adopts the subjective forecast rule (9), the resulting law of motion for
￿t is such that the fundamentals-based forecast is no longer the most accurate. Similar to the
lock-in phenomena described by David (1985) and Arthur (1989), externalities that arise from
an initial choice can lead to irreversibilities that may cause agents to stick with an inferior
technology. Here, the subjective forecast rule (9) can be viewed as an inferior prediction
technology because the mean squared forecast error could be lowered if the representative
agent could be induced to switch to the fundamentals-based forecast.
7 Other Models of In￿ ation Expectations
Other models of in￿ ation expectations have been proposed to address the shortcomings of
the fully-rational NKPC. Two commonly-used setups are ￿hybrid expectations￿and ￿sticky
information.￿
18Hybrid expectations can be represented as
b E he
t ￿t+1 = !Et￿t+1 + (1 ￿ !)￿t￿1; (23)
where expected in￿ ation at time t is a weighted-average of a rational forward-looking com-
ponent Et￿t+1 and a backward-looking component ￿t￿1: This setup can be motivated by the
presence of some rule-of-thumb agents (Roberts 1997, Gal￿ and Gertler 1999), alternative wage
contracts (Buiter and Jewitt 1981, Fuhrer and Moore 1995), or the use of backward-looking
price indexation by ￿rms (Woodford 2003). The exogenous weighting parameter ! is typically
set to a value around 0:5.
Sticky information can be represented as
b E si
t ￿t+1 = ￿
h
Et￿t+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)Et￿1￿t + (1 ￿ ￿)
2 Et￿2￿t￿1 + :::
i
; (24)
where expected in￿ ation at time t is an exponentially-weighted moving average of current
and past vintages of rational forecasts. The exogenous parameter ￿ can be interpreted as
the fraction of agents in the economy who update to the current vintage forecast Et￿t+1
each period. The sticky-information version of the NKPC was originally derived by Mankiw
and Reis (2002). Using survey data on household and professional in￿ ation forecasts, Carroll
(2003) estimates ￿ = 0:27:
Table 3 compares theoretical moments for ￿t and ￿￿t across the various expectation mod-
els.24 In each case, yt is governed by equation (2). As noted earlier, the rational expectations
(RE) model exhibits low in￿ ation persistence, but it does predict a strong negative autocor-
relation for the change in in￿ ation￿ a robust feature of U.S. data. The hybrid expectations
(HE) model is successful in generating more in￿ ation persistence, as indicated by the result
Corr(￿t;￿t￿1) = 0:87: Counterfactually, however, the HE model predicts a weak negative
autocorrelation for the change in in￿ ation, with Corr(￿￿t;￿￿t￿1) = ￿0:07. This de￿ciency
in the HE model has been pointed out by Cecchetti et al. (2007). The sticky information
(SI) model exhibits an intermediate level of in￿ ation persistence, while maintaining the strong
negative autocorrelation for the change in in￿ ation. The consistent expectations (CE) model
generates high in￿ ation persistence and a strong negative autocorrelation for the change in
in￿ ation. At the baseline parameterization, in￿ ation volatility is highest for the HE and CE
models.
24Details regarding the solutions of the HE and SI models are contained in Appendix C.









Corr(￿t;￿t￿1) 0:23 0:87 0:46 0:90
Corr(￿￿t;￿￿t￿1) ￿0:49 ￿0:07 ￿0:50 ￿0:46
Std: Dev:(￿t) 0:012 0:035 0:013 0:039
Std: Dev:(￿￿t) 0:014 0:018 0:014 0:018
Note: Parameter values are ￿ = 0:03; ￿ = 0:98, ￿ = 0:90; ￿" = ￿u = 0:01:
Numerous authors have demonstrated that U.S. in￿ ation exhibits a gradual, hump-shaped
response to unanticipated demand shocks. Although not plotted, the SI and the CE models
exhibit very similar hump-shaped responses when subjected to a 1-standard deviation shock to
ut in equation (2). A shift in ut can be interpreted as a surprise change in monetary policy that
causes an unexpected shift in aggregate demand.25 The SI and CE models share a common
trait. In both models, expected in￿ ation (and hence in￿ ation itself) is governed by a moving
average algorithm which delivers a hump-shaped response.
A natural extension of the CE model (discussed in the next section) allows the Kalman
gain ￿ to vary over time, giving rise to time-varying persistence and volatility. The HE and
SI models do not lend themselves to such an extension. Since ! and ￿ represent fractions of
agents of a particular type in the economy, these parameters would be expected to remain
fairly stable.
8 Model Simulations
Figure 8 plots simulated data for three di⁄erent forms of in￿ ation expectations. The left-side
panels show the results for rational expectations. The middle panels show the results for
consistent expectations, where the gain parameter is held constant at the theoretical equilib-
rium value ￿￿ = 0:346 implied by De￿nition 1. The right-side panels show the results for an
alternative ￿variable-gain￿version of the CE model that is described in Appendix A.
In the variable-gain model, the signal-to-noise ratio is inferred from the autocorrelation
of ￿￿t over a 20-year (80-quarter) rolling sample period, analogous to the procedure used to
construct Figure 5. The use of a rolling sample period allows for slowly-evolving perceptions of
the signal-to-noise ratio, where perceptions are based on each generation￿ s in￿ ation experience.
Alternatively, we may think of the representative agent as an econometrician who views 20-
year-old in￿ ation data as being uninformative about the current value of ￿. Friedman (1979,
p. 33) argues that most empirical time series analysis in economics is based on ￿some rough
25Mankiw and Reis (2002) demonstrate a hump-shaped impulse response to a demand shock in their version
of the SI model.
20form of rolling sample period.￿ 26
In the variable-gain model, the actual law of motion for in￿ ation is nonlinear and thus
capable of generating time-varying persistence and volatility. Recall that the model abstracts
from any changes in the actual in￿ ation trend; only the perceived trend is shifting. To achieve
a meaningful comparison with U.S. data (which may be in￿ uenced by historical changes in
the Fed￿ s in￿ ation target), I use a band pass ￿lter to detrend both the model-generated data
and the U.S. data.
[Figure 8 about here]
Comparing across panels 8a, 8b, and 8c, we see that the same sequence of random shocks
can lead to vastly di⁄erent in￿ ation dynamics, depending on the form of in￿ ation expectations.
The RE model￿ s detrended in￿ ation data exhibits very mild variation in persistence (panel 8d)
and essentially no variation in volatility (panel 8g). Detrended in￿ ation from the constant-gain
CE model exhibits a fair amount of variation in persistence (panel 8e), but very little variation
in volatility (panel 8h). Detrended in￿ ation from the variable-gain CE model exhibits large
variations in both persistence (panel 8f) and volatility (panel 8i).
Given that the variable-gain model is nonlinear, the rolling measures of persistence and
volatility can exhibit intervals of rapid variation followed by intervals of relative stability. This
behavior can be seen clearly in panels 8f and 8i. Experiments with the model show that the
agent￿ s use of a shorter rolling sample period to infer the signal-to-noise ratio ￿ contributes
to more rapid variation in persistence and volatility, but the rolling summary statistics can
still exhibit irregular intervals of rapid variation interspersed with intervals of relative stability.
Tables 4, 5, and 6 include results for the variable-gain model when the agent employs a shorter
(40-quarter) rolling sample period to infer ￿:
In contrast to the RE model, both versions of the CE model produce low-frequency swings
in the level of in￿ ation, as measured by either the band pass ￿lter trends (panels 8b and 8c)
or the 20-year rolling sample means (panels 8k and 81). The low-frequency swings are not
caused by changes in monetary policy. Instead, these movements derive solely from the near-
random walk behavior of in￿ ation under consistent expectations. To see this, note that the
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which implies that the sum of the weights on lagged in￿ ation is ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)=(1 ￿ ￿￿) = 0:970
when ￿ = 0:98 and ￿ = 0:346: Given the highly persistent nature of ￿t observed in equilibrium,
it would be very di¢ cult for the agent to the reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in in￿ ation,
thus lending support for the perceived law of motion (10).
26Another approach would be to adopt one of the many variable-gain algorithms that have been developed
in the vast literature on exponential smoothing. See, for example, Gardner (1985, p. 19).
21Figure 9 provides some additional justi￿cation for the variable-gain model. Panel 9a plots
the signal-to-noise ratios inferred from the rolling autocorrelation of ￿￿t for both a constant-
gain and a variable-gain simulation. The inferred value of ￿ from the constant-gain simulation
exhibits a fair amount of variation. Like Stock and Watson (2007), the agent may be inclined to
view the shock variances ￿2
￿ and ￿2
v in equation (10) as stochastic variables. From the agent￿ s
perspective, the presence of stochastic volatility would justify a switch to a variable-gain
forecasting algorithm. Once the switch occurs, the volatility of the perceived signal-to-noise
ratio becomes magni￿ed. The perception of stochastic volatility is thus self-con￿rming.
At times during the variable-gain simulation, the rolling sample autocorrelation of ￿￿t
may yield the result that ￿t < 0; which is infeasible for a ratio of two variances. When this
occurs, ￿t is set equal to ￿t￿1; i.e., the agent sticks with the previous estimate of the signal-
to-noise ratio if the most recent estimate is not economically reasonable.27 Similar results
are obtained if the agent sets ￿t = 0 whenever the sample autocorrelation statistic yields the
result ￿t < 0: Panel 9a shows that the sample autocorrelation statistic can imply ￿t < 0 for
sustained intervals during the simulation. Low values of the signal-to-noise ratio imply a low
value of the Kalman gain parameter which, in turn, serves to reduce in￿ ation persistence and
volatility as shown earlier in Figure 3. Consequently, a regime of low signal-to-noise ratios
tends to be self-perpetuating.
[Figure 9 about here]
Panel 9b plots the time-path of the variable Kalman gain for one simulation. The average
value of the gain over 200 simulations (each 2000 quarters in length) is 0.430. As noted
earlier in reference to the real-time learning algorithm, the shape of the map T (￿) implies
that a small amount of sampling variation in the autocorrelation of ￿￿t can translate into
sizable shifts in the Kalman gain. The gain rises sharply in response to upward spikes in
the perceived signal-to-noise ratio. These recurring episodes might interpreted as ￿credibility
crises￿or ￿in￿ ation scares,￿which cause the agent to heavily discount the central bank￿ s past
track record on in￿ ation. De￿ ation scares are also possible. Lastly, panel 9c shows that when
in￿ ation is actually generated using the variable-gain forecast, the agent perceives no accuracy
gain from switching to the fundamentals-based in￿ ation forecast. The RMSE for each forecast
is computed over a 20-year rolling sample period.
Table 4 provides a quantitative comparison of the forecast errors across the three forms
of in￿ ation expectations. The RE model delivers the most-accurate forecasts (as indicated
by the lowest RMSE value), whereas the variable-gain model delivers the least-accurate fore-
casts. However, as shown earlier, if the representative agent initially adopts the subjective
forecast rule (9), then the agent is unlikely to perceive any accuracy gain from switching to
27Timmerman (1996, p. 538) adopts a similar projection facility when introducing learning in an asset pricing
model.
22the fundamentals-based forecast. In the constant-gain model, the forecast errors are close to
white noise. In the variable-gain model, the forecasts errors exhibit some weak negative auto-
correlation, but it would take a large amount of data for the agent to reject the null hypothesis
of white noise errors, especially given the sampling variation in the autocorrelation statistic.
The explanation for the weak autocorrelation of forecast errors in the variable-gain model can
be traced back to Figure 7, which shows that the autocorrelation statistic is very ￿ at for most
values of ￿:
Table 4: Comparison of In￿ ation Forecast Errors
Model Simulations
CE-variable ￿
Statistic RE CE-constant ￿ Ts = 80 Ts = 40
RMSE 0:010 0:015 0:032 0:046
Corr(errt;errt￿1) 0:001 0:000 ￿0:090 ￿0:156
Corr(errt;errt￿2) 0:000 ￿0:001 ￿0:037 ￿0:059
Corr(errt;errt￿3) ￿0:002 ￿0:004 ￿0:029 ￿0:036
Notes: Statistics above refer to raw data averaged over 200 simulations, where each
simulation runs for 2000 quarters after dropping 200 quarters. Ts = length of rolling
sample period (in quarters) for computing the perceived signal-to-noise ratio ￿:
Parameter values: ￿ = 0:03; ￿ = 0:98; ￿ = 0:90; ￿" = ￿u = 0:01:
Table 5: Unconditional Moments, Raw and Detrended Data
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Corr(￿￿t;￿￿t￿1) ￿0:27 ￿0:34 ￿0:48 ￿0:46 ￿0:31 ￿0:28
Notes: Statistics for ￿t are based on raw data (top number) and detrended data (bottom number).
Statistics for ￿￿t are based on raw data. Model statistics are averaged over 200 simulations,
where each simulation runs for 2000 quarters after dropping 200 quarters. Ts = length of rolling
sample (in quarters) for computing the perceived signal-to-noise ratio ￿: Parameter values: ￿ = 0:03;
￿ = 0:98; ￿ = 0:90; ￿" = ￿u = 0:01:
Table 5 compares the moments of U.S. data with the corresponding moments from model
simulations. Statistics are presented for both raw and detrended data. Again, I focus on
the behavior of the detrended data. The persistence of detrended in￿ ation is highest for the
23variable-gain model which yields a ￿rst-order autocorrelation of around 0:4; thus providing the
best match with detrended U.S. in￿ ation data. The standard deviation of detrended in￿ ation
in the variable-gain model is 0.032 when Ts = 80 and 0.045 when Ts = 40: These are the
largest values among the di⁄erent models. The corresponding ￿gure for long-run U.S. CPI
in￿ ation is 0.073, whereas the ￿gure for post-World War II GDP price in￿ ation is 0.016.
Table 6: Average Amplitude of Variation in 20-Year Rolling Summary Statistics
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Notes: Statistics are the average maximum and average minimum values recorded over 200 simulations,
where each simulation runs for 2000 quarters after dropping 200 quarters. Persistence and volatility
statistics are based on detrended data. Mean statistics are based on raw data. Ts = length of rolling
sample period (in quarters) for computing the perceived signal-to-noise ratio ￿: Parameter values: ￿ = 0:98;
￿ = 0:03; ￿ = 0:90; ￿" = ￿u = 0:01:
To provide a better sense of the invariant distributions generated by the di⁄erent expec-
tation models, Table 6 reports the average amplitude of variation of selected 20-year rolling
summary statistics. The statistics for persistence and volatility are based on detrended data,
whereas the statistics for the mean are based on raw data (since the mean of detrended data is
zero by construction). The U.S. data exhibits large swings in the rolling summary statistics,
as shown earlier in Figure 1. On average, the variable-gain model exhibits the largest swings
in the rolling summary statistics. When the agent uses a shorter sample period (Ts = 40) to
infer ￿ from past data, the amplitude of variation in the rolling summary statistics becomes
somewhat larger.
An informal visual comparison between Figure 1 and Figure 8 shows that the variable-
gain model can generate time-varying persistence and volatility that is broadly similar to that
observed in long-run U.S. data. The performance of the RE model on this front could of
course be improved by introducing a heteroskedastic process for the driving variable yt; or
by introducing a persistent exogenous process for the central bank￿ s actual in￿ ation target.
The results presented here suggest that complicated exogenous driving processes may not be
24needed to account for many features of U.S. in￿ ation dynamics, if one is willing to entertain
the idea of bounded rationality.
9 Was the Great In￿ ation Caused by Bad Luck?
An enormous literature has explored explanations for the ￿Great In￿ ation￿of the 1970s and
the subsequent ￿Volcker disin￿ ation￿of the early 1980s. Theories about the rise and fall of
U.S. in￿ ation fall roughly into one of three categories: (i) bad luck theories, (ii) policy mistake
theories, and (iii) combination theories (where chance and policy discretion both play a role).
One bad-luck theory is that U.S. in￿ ation is governed by a unit-root process or something
close to a unit root. This means that a sequence of white-noise shocks can generate large
excursions in the in￿ ation rate without any fundamental change in the underlying economy.
According to this theory, there is nothing special about the 1970s and 1980s and similar events
can happen again, given enough time. King and Watson (1994) present evidence that post-war
U.S. in￿ ation is indeed governed by a unit-root process.
The variable-gain CE model produces some episodes where the 20-year rolling measures
of persistence, volatility, and mean of raw in￿ ation all trace out hump-shaped patterns.28
The patterns are somewhat similar to those in post-World War II U.S. data. The simulation
results suggest that white-noise fundamental shocks, propagated via the expectations feedback
mechanism, could have played a role in producing the historical pattern of U.S. in￿ ation. Along
these lines, Blinder (1982) argues that oil and food price shocks, coupled with pent-up in￿ ation
from the release of the Nixon wage-price controls in 1974, can account for most of the rise in
in￿ ation during the 1970s. He also argues that the absence of these same factors can account
for most of the fall in in￿ ation during the early 1980s. More recently, Sims and Zha (2006)
argue that the primary source of the rise and fall of U.S. in￿ ation was a ￿changing array of
major disturbances￿that occurred during a relatively stable monetary policy regime.
Detailed historical studies by Hetzel (1998), Mayer (1999), and Nelson (2005) all emphasize
the idea that monetary policymakers of the 1970s believed that much of the observed in￿ ation
was being driven by factors outside of the Fed￿ s control. At the peak of the Great In￿ ation, Fed
Chairman Volcker (1979, pp. 888-889) acknowledged the importance of in￿ ation expectations
as an independent driving force for realized in￿ ation. He said: ￿In￿ ation feeds in part on
itself, so part of the job of returning to a more stable and more productive economy must be
to break the grip of in￿ ationary expectations.￿
Notwithstanding the above discussion, changes in monetary policy do appear to have played
a role in shaping the pattern of U.S. in￿ ation￿ with the Volcker disin￿ ation serving as the
prime example. Research discussing this episode typically emphasizes the role of central bank
28When Ts = 80; the average raw data correlation between the 20-year rolling persistence measure and the
20-year rolling volatility measure in the simulations is 0.64. The average raw data correlation between the
20-year rolling persistence measure and the 20-year rolling mean is 0.01.
25credibility, noting that the rate at which credibility accumulates depends on the nature of
in￿ ation expectations.29 This idea connects well with the interpretation of the perceived
signal-to-noise ratio as an inverse measure of central bank credibility.
A comprehensive study of the Great In￿ ation and the subsequent ￿Great Moderation￿pe-
riod of reduced macroeconomic volatility would require a fully-articulated model that includes
both a micro-founded IS equation and a speci￿cation for shifts in monetary policy. The results
presented here suggest that boundedly-rational in￿ ation expectations may be a useful element
of such a study.
10 Concluding Remarks
Evolving theories about in￿ ation expectations, led by the contributions of Phelps (1967), Fried-
man (1968), Sargent (1971), and Lucas (1972, 1973) have played an important role in shaping
the modern view of the Phillips curve. The current workhorse version for macroeconomics is
the New Keynesian Phillips curve with rational expectations. The advantages of the NKPC
are its tractability and its link to microfoundations that assume optimizing behavior on the
part of agents and ￿rms. The biggest disadvantage of the NKPC is its inability to account
endogenously for some important quantitative features of U.S. in￿ ation dynamics.
Rational expectations are sometimes called ￿model consistent expectations.￿A more pre-
cise term would be ￿actual-model consistent expectations,￿because the maintained assumption
is that the agent knows the actual model. In contrast, the concept explored in this paper could
be described as ￿perceived-model consistent expectations,￿because the agent￿ s forecast rule
is optimized for a perceived law of motion for in￿ ation, given the observed moments of the
in￿ ation time series.
In the boundedly-rational NKPC examined here, expected in￿ ation is an exponentially-
weighted moving average of past observed in￿ ation rates. The observed autocorrelation of
in￿ ation changes is used to pin down the value of the Kalman gain parameter that governs
the weights assigned to past rates of in￿ ation in the agent￿ s forecast rule. This result harkens
back to the ￿accelerationist controversy￿ identi￿ed by Sargent (1971, p. 35) who argued
persuasively that any forecast weighting scheme involving past rates of in￿ ation should ￿be
compatible with the observed evolution of the rate of in￿ ation.￿
In the variable Kalman gain version of the model, endogenous shifts in the agent￿ s perceived
signal-to-noise ratio (which might be viewed as an inverse-measure of central bank credibility)
give rise to changes in in￿ ation persistence and volatility. These changes can take place in
the absence of any underlying shifts in monetary policy. This feature of the model o⁄ers a
possible explanation for the end-of-sample changes in U.S. in￿ ation dynamics shown in Figure
1, which have occurred during a period of seemingly-unchanged monetary policy.
29For references to this large literature, see Huh and Lansing (2000) and Erceg and Levin (2003).
26A Appendix: Real-Time Learning and Variable-Gain Model
Real-time learning is discussed in Section 4 of the text. The learning algorithm is described
by the following system of nonlinear equations
￿t = ￿ b Et￿t+1 + ￿yt + "t; (A.1)
b Et￿t+1 = b Et￿1￿t + ￿t￿1
￿









































1 + ￿t￿1 + ￿t
; (A.7)
where yt is governed by equation (2). Equations (A.1) and (A.2) de￿ne the actual law of
motion for in￿ ation when the Kalman gain is evolving over time. Equations (A.3) through
(A.5) are used to recursively estimate the autocorrelation of in￿ ation changes using all past
data.30 Equation (A.6) is the full-sample estimate of the signal-to-noise ratio. Equation (A.7)
is the out-of-steady state version of the Kalman gain formula (11).31
To obtain the ￿variable-gain￿version of the model that is discussed in Section 8 of the
text, equations (A.3) through (A.5) are modi￿ed to compute the autocorrelation of in￿ ation
changes over a 20-year rolling sample period rather than over the full sample period. Both the
real-time learning algorithm and the variable-gain model employ a ￿projection facility,￿which
sets ￿t = ￿t￿1 whenever the sample autocorrelation of ￿￿t yields the result that ￿t < 0:
B Appendix: Moments of In￿ ation Forecast Errors
This appendix provides analytical expressions for the moments used in plotting Figure 7.
Consider the case when the representative agent initially adopts the subjective forecast rule
(9). In equilibrium, the actual law of motion is given by equation (12). Both the subjective
































30These formulas are adapted from Hommes and Sorger (1998, pp. 320-321).
31For the derivation of equation (A.7), see McCulloch (2005). Use of the steady-state Kalman gain formula









are given by (14) and (17).
Again starting from (21), it can be shown that the covariance of sequential forecast errors
is given by
Cov (errt+1;errt) =
[￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)] ￿2￿2
u
(1 ￿ ￿￿)





















Dividing the above equation by MSE = V ar(errt+1) from (B.1) yields a complicated
expression for Corr(errt+1;errt): However, the following simpli￿ed version can be obtained
by letting ￿ ! 1
Corr(errt+1;errt)￿!1 =
￿2￿




which bears a striking resemblance to the autocorrelation of in￿ ation under rational expecta-
tions, as given by (6) A comparison of (6) and (B.3) reveals that parameter con￿gurations
which give rise to low autocorrelation of in￿ ation under rational expectations will imply an
even lower autocorrelation of forecast errors under the subjective forecast rule (9).
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continue to be given by (14) and (17).
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C Appendix: Other Models of In￿ ation Expectations
This appendix outlines the model solutions discussed in Section 7 of the text.
28C.1 Hybrid Expectations
Substituting equation (23) into the NKPC (1) and then solving for the equilibrium law of
motion using the method of undetermined coe¢ cients yields
￿t = d￿￿t￿1 +
￿
￿





1 ￿ (￿ + d￿)￿!
￿
"t; (C.1)
where d￿ is the smaller root of the quadratic equation ￿! (d￿)
2 ￿ d￿ + ￿ (1 ￿ !) = 0: At
the baseline parameter values with ! = 0:5; we have d￿ = 0:82: From (C.1), the rational
forward-looking component in (23) is given by
Et￿t+1 = d￿￿t +
￿
￿￿
1 ￿ (￿ + d￿)￿!
￿
yt; (C.2)
which reduces to the RE model forecast (8) when ! = 1 such that d￿ = 0:
C.2 Sticky Information
Equation (24) can be written in recursive form as b E si
t ￿t+1 = ￿Et￿t+1 + (1 ￿ ￿) b E si
t￿1￿t:
Substituting the recursive form into the NKPC (1) and then solving for the equilibrium law of
motion using the method of undetermined coe¢ cients yields the following system of equations
￿t = d￿ b E si
t￿1￿t +
￿
￿ (1 ￿ ￿d￿)
1 ￿ (￿￿ + d￿)￿
￿











1 ￿ (￿￿ + d￿)￿
￿
yt; (C.4)
where d￿ is the smaller root of the quadratic equation ￿(d￿)
2 ￿ d￿ + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) = 0: At the
baseline parameter values with ￿ = 0:27; we have d￿ = 0:97: From (C.3), the current vintage
rational forecast is given by
Et￿t+1 = d￿ b E si
t ￿t+1 +
￿
￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿d￿)
1 ￿ (￿￿ + d￿)￿
￿
yt; (C.5)
which reduces to the RE model forecast (8) when ￿ = 1 such that d￿ = 0:
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